At present, the international rules for digital trade are mainly reflected in bilateral and regional trade agreements such as WTO e-commerce negotiations, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), the Japan US Digital Trade Agreement (JUDTA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the upgraded Australia Singapore Free Trade Agreement (ASFTA).
Progress and Differences in WTO E-commerce Negotiations
(1) Overview of the Development of WTO E-commerce Negotiations
The WTO negotiations on digital trade rules are conducted within the framework of e-commerce, and most members' proposals in the multilateral negotiations do not strictly distinguish between the concepts of "e-commerce" and "digital trade". In December 2017, Buenos Aires, Argentina held the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference, during which 71 member countries jointly signed the first Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, reaffirming the importance of global e-commerce and creating opportunities for inclusive development of digital trade; On January 25, 2019, the informal ministerial meeting on e-commerce was held in Davos, Switzerland. 76 member countries jointly signed the second Joint Statement on E-commerce, agreeing to launch WTO e-commerce negotiations and further stating that the purpose of the negotiations is to achieve higher standards of results based on existing WTO agreements and frameworks, with the participation of as many WTO members as possible; In July 2021, the ambassadors of Australia, Japan, and Singapore to the WTO issued a statement stating that 86 WTO members have signed the Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, making substantial progress in eight provisions including online consumer protection, electronic signatures and authentication, non invited commercial electronic information, open government data, electronic contracts, transparency, paperless trade, and online openness, and further strengthening discussions on issues such as duty-free electronic transmission, cross-border data flow, localization of computing facilities, and source code.
From January 2019 to February 2023, WTO members submitted a total of 92 proposals related to e-commerce, of which 50 were publicly disclosed. In addition to 9 ceremonial proposals, there were a total of 41 substantive proposals. According to the specific content of the proposal, it can be roughly divided into four categories of rules: data flow, privacy protection, market access, and trade promotion (see Table 1).
表1 WTO成员方电子商务提案的议题分类
表1 WTO成员方电子商务提案的议题分类 | |
---|---|
议题分类 | 具体内容 |
数据流动 | 跨境数据流动、计算设施本地化、网络开放、网络中介免责、公开政府数据 |
隐私保护 | 国内监管框架、个人信息保护、网络消费者保护、非应邀商业电子信息、网络安全 |
市场准入 | 数字产品的非歧视待遇、电子商务领域的知识产权保护、平台垄断、源代码问题、电信行业市场竞争、监管有效性和透明度 |
贸易促进 | 无纸化贸易、电子传输免征关税、电子签名和电子认证、数字鸿沟、电子支付、促进电子商务发展的合作 |
资料来源:作者整理所得。 |
Table 1 Classification of Issues in WTO Members' E-commerce Proposals
(2) Analysis of WTO E-commerce Negotiation Positions of Member Countries
According to proposals on e-commerce from different countries, it can be found that there are significant differences and different interests in digital trade rules, mainly including cross-border data flow and prohibition of localization requirements, source code and algorithm regulations, and duty-free and digital tax collection for electronic transmission.
The first category is open member countries represented by the United States and Japan, and the proposals mainly involve two types of issues: data flow and market access. From the perspective of data flow issues, the United States aims to break down various artificial non-tariff barriers in the field of digital trade. By allowing cross-border free flow of data, opening up the internet, and exempting some online platforms from responsibility, the United States aims to create a relatively free business environment for its multinational digital giants on the basis of promoting the free flow of various data information, further strengthening the monopoly position of multinational digital giants in international digital trade; From the perspective of market access issues, the scope of non discrimination obligations for digital products in trade agreements concluded by the United States is gradually narrowing. One is to remove the initial provision that "non contracting parties' digital products and producers can also enjoy non discrimination obligations" from the agreement terms; The second is to remove the "storage" of non discriminatory treatment for digital products by introducing the "localization of computing facilities" rule. For example, CPTPP prohibits the principle of localizing computing facilities, making the "storage" of digital products unable to be a reason for discriminatory treatment; The third is to exclude the "distributor" rights in non discriminatory treatment of digital products. For example, some software in the Apple Store is provided to non US contracting parties, and according to existing rules, these distributors cannot enjoy non discriminatory treatment, which means that non discriminatory benefits are more strictly limited between contracting parties. The purpose of setting up a relatively strict digital product market access system in the United States is to limit non discriminatory treatment to contracting states and establish a digital system alliance led by itself; On the other hand, it ensures that its core digital technology and digital industry are not infringed upon. Japan's proposals on data flow and market access issues are highly similar to those of the United States. In addition, Japan's e-commerce proposals also take into account its own interests. For example, Japan calls for trade aid to developing countries, narrowing the digital divide between countries and expanding Japan's global digital trade market; Protect the digital intellectual property of Japanese companies by prohibiting the government from improperly obtaining trade secrets, privacy/industry data, and other measures.
The second category is comprehensive member states represented by the European Union, Singapore, Canada, and Brazil, whose e-commerce proposals involve four types of issues. From the perspective of data flow issues, these countries support banning the localization and open source code of computing facilities, allowing for free cross-border data flow, while also reserving space for domestic regulatory autonomy and emphasizing security exceptions. From the perspective of privacy protection issues, these countries all support providing a good online environment for online consumers, regulating non invited commercial electronic information, and protecting personal information from infringement. From the perspective of market access issues, these countries have different focuses, with Singapore only mentioning non discriminatory treatment for digital products; The EU focuses on formulating market access rules for the telecommunications industry, including redefining the connotation of the telecommunications industry, proposing competitive safeguard measures for the telecommunications industry, and improving the legal certainty and predictability of telecommunications suppliers; Canada believes that cross-border services are generally provided by electronic communications, and when considering market access for e-commerce, it is necessary to clarify the service trade model based on electronic communications and further provide a list of illegal targeted discrimination and grounds for discrimination; Although Brazil supports the non discriminatory treatment of digital products, due to the relatively backward development of the domestic digital industry and the lack of technology giants and large Internet companies, it emphasizes more on platform monopoly, network platform non exemption and other issues. From the perspective of trade promotion issues, the EU and Canada support duty-free electronic transmission, electronic signatures, and electronic authentication, but have not taken any further measures. On the basis of the above rules, Singapore proposes that member states should recognize the importance of electronic invoice systems and the legal effect of electronic transferable records, encourage member states to operate electronic invoice systems with each other, and strive to achieve mutual recognition of electronic transferable records. Brazil has proposed a series of actionable measures based on paperless trade, including single window, availability of electronic trade information, customs release and clearance under digital technology, etc.
The third category is composed of cautious member states represented by China and Russia, whose proposals mainly involve privacy protection and trade promotion issues. As an emerging digital trading power, China's comparative advantage is cross-border trade in goods on the Internet and e-commerce platforms. Therefore, in specific proposals, China prefers to facilitate cross-border e-commerce initiatives, supports member countries to further improve customs procedures, implement electronic payment within the practical scope, and encourages member countries to make full use of free trade zones and customs warehouses to promote cross-border e-commerce. Russia's proposal focuses more on personal privacy and information protection, believing that member states should protect the interests of online consumers through cooperation with regulatory authorities and providing a list of possible measures for cross-border infringement of online consumer rights.
The fourth category is the cooperative and inclusive member states represented by Cote d'Ivoire. There are significant differences between these countries and developed countries in terms of digital infrastructure, digital technology applications, and digital talent. The objective existence of the digital divide restricts the ability of developing countries to deeply participate in e-commerce. Therefore, C ô te d'Ivoire proposes to bridge the digital divide between developed and developing countries by establishing inter agency cooperation forums, setting up aid funds, and emphasizing differential treatment methods. For example, C ô te d'Ivoire believes that current developing countries do not have the ability to provide a market access list for digital products and should publish a liberalization timetable within 10 years.
Overview and Template Analysis of Digital Trade Rules in Two FTAs
(1) Overview of Digital Trade Rules in FTA
At present, there is a lack of multilateral digital trade rules represented by the WTO, making it difficult for countries to use traditional trade rules under the WTO and GATT frameworks to solve a series of problems such as market access for digital products, cross-border data flow, and protection of digital intellectual property rights. In 2000, the United States Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) included the e-commerce chapter for the first time in the FTA. Since then, more and more countries have regarded the e-commerce chapter as an important part of FTA negotiations to address the problems encountered in the digital trade process.
From 2000 to 2022, a total of 93 free trade agreements (FTAs) included independent e-commerce chapters, accounting for 27% of all FTAs notified to the WTO and in effect. Among them, 25 were concluded between developed countries, 57 between developed countries and developing countries, and 11 between developing countries and developing countries (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The number of FTAs with independent e-commerce chapters from 2000 to 2022
In addition to the increasing number of FTAs containing independent e-commerce chapters, the specific digital trade rules covered in e-commerce chapters exhibit characteristics of increased clauses, improved standards, and significant differences. According to statistics from the Regional Trade Agreement Electronic Commerce and Data Terms Database (TAPED), the number of e-commerce chapters has rapidly increased since 2015. Before 2015, the average number of rules and word count in the e-commerce chapter were 5.6 and 610.9, respectively; After 2015, the average number of rules and word count for e-commerce chapters were 13.4 and 2126.2, respectively. Moreover, in recent years, second-generation digital trade rules such as cross-border data flow, source code issues, and localization of computing facilities have been widely included in the e-commerce chapter. At the same time, due to the consideration of their own interests, countries are constantly increasing the number of digital trade rules in FTAs and deepening their content details, resulting in a high degree of heterogeneity in digital trade rules. Monteiro and Robert used the Jaccard index to measure the differences in digital trade rules in FTAs. After comparing 75 FTAs with independent e-commerce chapters, they found that nearly 80% of the Jaccard index was below 0.2.
(2) Analysis of Digital Trade Rule Template in FTA
This report divides the digital trade rule templates in FTA into "American template", "European template", "New template" and "Chinese template", and compares and analyzes the core concepts, specific contents and main features of the four templates in conjunction with the digital trade rules in FTA.
1. "American Template"
According to data released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the scale of US digital services trade accounted for 16% of the total global digital services trade in 2020. As a major and powerful country in global digital service trade, the United States attaches great importance to the construction of digital trade rules in FTA and attempts to lead global digital economic governance by introducing digital trade rules centered on its own interests. The "American template" has roughly gone through three stages of development.
From 2000 to 2007, the "American template" established hard rules such as "exemption of tariffs on electronic transmissions" and "national treatment and most favored nation treatment for digital products", while others were mostly soft rules. In 2007, the US South Korea Free Trade Agreement for the first time separated the free flow of cross-border data from the cooperation clause and established an independent clause, emphasizing the importance of both sides recognizing the free flow of information for trade. At this point, the core rules of "American Template 1.0" have been basically established.
From 2008 to 2016, the United States laid the foundation for the "American template 2.0" negotiations of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) to promote trade liberalization in the Asia Pacific region. The TPP changes the "free flow of cross-border data" from soft rules to hard rules, and further considers regulatory requirements, stipulating that contracting parties may restrict data flow for legitimate public policy purposes, but this measure must not constitute disguised trade discrimination, thus constituting a regulatory paradigm of "rules+exceptions" for the free flow of data across borders. This rule has also become the main template for subsequent "cross-border data free flow" rules. At the same time, TPP further introduces hard rules such as "localization of computing facilities" and "source code issues", as well as soft rules such as "personal information protection", "network consumer protection", and "network security". Although TPP ultimately went bankrupt due to the withdrawal of the United States, its digital trade rules have had a profound impact on subsequent FTAs.
Since 2017, the US Mexico Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA) between the United States and Mexico and Canada has become the "American template 3.0". The deepening form of USMCA is reflected in: firstly, removing domestic regulatory requirements in "free flow of cross-border data" and "localization of computing facilities", and further removing security exceptions in "localization of computing facilities"; Secondly, expand the scope of information protection in the "source code issue", stipulate that source code disclosure shall not be used as a market access condition or mandatory disclosure condition, and exclude the obligation to disclose source code for critical infrastructure; Third, expand the liability limitation of Internet service providers from the intellectual property chapter to the digital trade chapter, and exempt Internet service providers from intermediary liability; Fourth, eliminate the national treatment and most favored nation treatment rights of distributors' digital products, and implement stricter market access systems for them. The US Japan Digital Trade Agreement (UJDTA) is roughly similar to the USMCA, but the establishment of some provisions is not as radical as the USMCA, such as the "localization of computing facilities" rule. Although it also eliminates regulatory requirements and security exceptions for contracting parties, it explicitly states that computing facilities in the financial industry may not comply with this regulation.
From the main content and evolution path, the "American template" has the following characteristics: firstly, it was proposed earliest and has a wide coverage of terms; Secondly, some of the provisions are highly forward-looking and have largely led the development of second-generation digital trade rules; Thirdly, the establishment and introduction of digital trade rules and provisions fully reflect the demands and ambitions of the United States in the field of digital trade. The content and deepening form of the above provisions are consistent with the core demands reflected in the US WTO e-commerce negotiation proposal, which advocates for the free flow of data and the establishment of a relatively free digital business environment for its own digital trade, while maintaining the competitive advantage of US digital giants in core technologies such as algorithms and network platform interests.
The digital trade rules concluded by Japan in the early days (before 2015) did not include data flow rules. The achievement of the TPP in 2015 marked a shift in Japan's digital trade rules. Since then, the paradigm of digital trade rules concluded by Japan has basically followed the "American template". The content of digital trade rules in Japan Mongolia FTA, CPTPP, UJDTA, and Japan UK FTA basically follows TPP. However, based on Japan's WTO e-commerce negotiation proposal and domestic legislative situation, unlike the free flow of data advocated by the United States, Japan prioritizes personal privacy protection and digital intellectual property rights, while minimizing cross-border data flow barriers as much as possible while meeting the above conditions. The digital trade rules of the "American template" are shown in Table 2.
表2 “美式模板”的数字贸易规则
表2 “美式模板”的数字贸易规则 | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FTA | 数据流动 | 隐私保护 | 市场准入 | 贸易促进 | ||||||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | |
美国 | ||||||||||||||||||
美国—约旦(2000) | × | × | S | × | S | × | S | × | H | S | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
美国—新加坡(2003) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | × | × |
美国—智利(2003) | S | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | S | H | H | × | × | H | × | S | × |
美国—澳大利亚(2004) | × | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | S |
美国—马来西亚(2004) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | × | × | |
美国—CAFTA(2004) | S | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | S | H | H | × | × | H | H | × | × |
美国—巴林(2005) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | × | × | |
美国—秘鲁(2006) | × | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | S |
美国—阿曼(2006) | × | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | × | × |
美国—哥伦比亚(2006) | × | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | S |
美国—韩国(2007) | S | × | S | × | × | S | S | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | S |
美国—巴拿马(2007) | S | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | S | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | × |
TPP(2016) | H | H | S | × | H | H | H | H | H | S | H | H | H | × | H | × | H | S |
USMCA(2018) | H | H | S | S | H | H | H | H | H | S | H | H | H | × | H | × | H | S |
UJDTA(2019) | H | H | × | S | × | H | H | H | H | S | H | H | H | × | H | × | H | × |
日本 | ||||||||||||||||||
日本—新加坡(2002) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | S |
日本—菲律宾(2006) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | S |
日本—泰国(2007) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | S |
日本—瑞士(2009) | × | × | × | × | S | S | S | S | × | S | H | H | × | H | H | × | H | S |
日本—澳大利亚(2014) | × | × | × | × | H | H | S | S | × | S | H | H | × | H | H | × | H | S |
日本—蒙古国(2015) | S | H | × | × | × | H | S | S | × | S | H | H | H | H | H | H | S | |
日本—欧盟(2018) | × | × | × | × | × | S | S | H | × | S | × | × | H | H | H | × | H | × |
CPTPP(2018) | H | H | S | × | H | H | H | H | H | S | H | H | H | × | H | × | H | S |
RCEP(2020) | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | H | H | S | × | × | S | × | H | × | H | S |
日本—英国(2020) | H | H | S | S | H | H | H | H | × | × | × | × | H | H | H | × | H | × |
注:序号1~18代表的规则依次为跨境数据流动,计算设施本地化,网络开放,公开政府数据,个人信息保护(国际标准),个人信息保护(国内标准),网络消费者保护,非应邀商业电子信息,统一监管框架,网络安全,数字产品国民待遇,数字产品最惠国待遇,源代码问题,技术中立原则,电子传输免征关税,载体媒介,电子认证、电子签名和数字证书,无纸化贸易。H代表硬性规则,S代表软性规则,×代表协定中未涉及的规则。 | ||||||||||||||||||
资料来源:作者根据RTA数据库及《数字贸易协定》整理所得。 |
Table 2: Digital Trade Rules of the American Template
2. "European Template"
According to data released by UNCTAD, in 2020, the scale of digital service trade among EU countries accounted for as much as 39% of the global digital service trade volume. Although the total amount of digital service trade among EU countries is higher than that of the United States, the number and depth of digital trade rules introduced in EU FTAs are significantly lagging behind those of the United States. In 2002, the EU Chile FTA first introduced an e-commerce chapter and stipulated the use of international standards to protect personal information. The digital trade rules in subsequent FTAs mainly revolve around privacy protection and trade promotion rules. After 2018, the digital trade rules in the EU's FTA only partially involved data flow and market access rules. For example, the EU Japan FTA included hard rules on "source code issues" and "technology neutrality", the EU Singapore FTA included soft rules on "cross-border free flow of data" for the first time, and the EU UK FTA included hard rules on "cross-border free flow of data" and soft rules on "open government data" for the first time. In addition, the EU UK FTA stipulates that the contracting parties shall continuously review the implementation and operation of cross-border data flows within three years of the FTA coming into effect, and the contracting parties may at any time recommend the other contracting party to review the list of restrictions prohibiting data localization. This is consistent with the position proposed by the EU in the WTO e-commerce negotiations, which prioritizes the protection of personal data and privacy, and promotes the free flow of data through various measures to restrict data localization.
From the perspective of the main content and evolution path of the "European template", digital trade rules generally lack an independent and complete system, mainly manifested in the following points: firstly, there are a large number of FTAs (14) with e-commerce chapters, but there are relatively few substantive rules involved. Secondly, the terms are flexible and varied, and there is no unified stance on external affairs. The EU's formulation of digital trade rules is usually handled flexibly based on the comparative advantages of contracting states. For example, in the FTAs concluded after 2018, the EU Japan FTA introduced transitional clauses for the "free flow of data across borders" rule, the EU Singapore FTA introduced soft rules, the EU UK FTA introduced hard rules under the "restricted list" model, and the EU Vietnam FTA did not introduce relevant rules. Thirdly, implement a strict market access system for digital products. The EU has repeatedly emphasized the "audiovisual exception" in the WTO e-commerce negotiation proposal, and the audiovisual sector is a key component of digital trade. The EU has always taken a cautious attitude towards market access for digital products, and the FTA it has concluded does not include the rules of "national treatment and most favored nation treatment for digital products". Fourthly, there is a lack of a text paradigm for digital trade rules based on self-interest. Privacy protection is an inviolable core in EU trade negotiations, and the EU has also formulated a series of regional laws including the General Data Protection Regulation and the Cybersecurity Act to maintain information security. However, in the FTAs concluded by the European Union, privacy protection rules have not yet formed rules with EU characteristics, and key principles such as purpose norms and usage restrictions have not been introduced in the "personal information protection" rules. "Non invited commercial electronic information" and "online consumer protection" are mainly based on soft rules, lacking sufficient binding force. The digital trade rules of the "European template" are shown in Table 3.
表3 “欧式模板”的数字贸易规则
表3 “欧式模板”的数字贸易规则 | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FTA | 数据流动 | 隐私保护 | 市场准入 | 贸易促进 | ||||||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | |
欧盟—智利(2002) | × | × | × | × | H | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
欧盟—加勒比海国家(2008) | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
欧盟—韩国(2010) | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S |
欧盟—南美洲(2012) | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S |
欧盟—中美洲(2012) | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | S | S | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
欧盟—格鲁吉亚(2014) | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
欧盟—乌克兰(2014) | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
欧盟—摩洛哥(2014) | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | × | S | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
欧盟—加拿大(2016) | × | × | × | × | H | H | S | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
欧盟—亚美尼亚(2017) | × | × | × | × | H | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × | |
欧盟—日本(2018) | × | × | × | × | × | S | S | H | × | S | × | × | H | H | H | × | H | × |
欧盟—新加坡(2018) | S | × | × | × | H | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | H | × | |
欧盟—越南(2019) | × | × | × | × | × | × | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | S | × |
欧盟—英国(2020) | H | × | × | × | × | H | H | H | × | × | × | × | H | H | H | × | H | × |
注:序号1~18代表的规则依次为跨境数据流动,计算设施本地化,网络开放,公开政府数据,个人信息保护(国际标准),个人信息保护(国内标准),网络消费者保护,非应邀商业电子信息,统一监管框架,网络安全,数字产品国民待遇,数字产品最惠国待遇,源代码问题,技术中立原则,电子传输免征关税,载体媒介,电子认证、电子签名和数字证书,无纸化贸易。H代表硬性规则,S代表软性规则,×代表协定中未涉及的规则。 | ||||||||||||||||||
资料来源:作者根据RTA数据库及《数字贸易协定》整理所得。 |
Table 3: Digital Trade Rules of the European Template
3. "New Template"
According to data released by UNCTAD, Singapore's digital service trade accounted for less than 1% of global digital service trade in 2020, indicating relatively weak competitiveness in digital service trade. From the early FTAs concluded by Singapore, digital trade rules mainly involve "exemption of tariffs on electronic transmissions" and "national treatment and non discriminatory treatment of digital products". In 2016, the Singapore Australia FTA basically followed the TPP related rules in digital trade rules, not only introducing data flow rules such as "cross-border free flow of data", "localization of computing facilities", and "network openness" into the agreement, but also adding mandatory privacy protection rules such as "personal information protection" and "non invited commercial electronic information". In addition, TPP has upgraded the previous "paperless trade" rules from soft rules to hard rules. In 2020, the Singapore Australia Digital Economy Agreement not only introduced the rule of "government data openness", but also further deepened the specific content of previous digital trade rules. For example, key principles such as purpose specification, security protection, personal participation, and accountability were added to the "personal information protection" rule, "single window" construction was added to the "paperless trade" rule, and specific measures for electronic invoices were added to the "electronic signature and electronic authentication" rule. The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) innovatively introduces soft rules such as cross-border logistics, artificial intelligence, and data innovation. The above content elevates Singapore's digital trade rules to a new level, providing more detailed and specific regulatory paradigms for privacy protection and trade promotion rules, and promoting the facilitation of digital trade and the development of emerging technologies.
From the main content and evolution path of the "new template", it has the following characteristics: firstly, the number of FTAs with e-commerce chapters is the highest (17), and the conclusion time is relatively early. Secondly, early digital trade rules were mostly market access and trade promotion rules. After 2016, many rules from the TPP were followed, and the advocated rules were closer to the "American template". Due to Singapore's overall digital competitiveness still lagging behind the United States, the setting of data flow rules has not been as radical as the "American template 3.0", and the relevant provisions have not excluded domestic regulatory autonomy and security exception regulations. Thirdly, the Singapore Australia Digital Economy Agreement and DEPA have added multiple innovative digital trade rules. The digital trade rules covered by the agreement are flexible and inclusive, taking into account the interests of developing countries, and a "new template" is gradually forming. The digital trade rules of the "New Template" are shown in Table 4.
表4 “新式模板”的数字贸易规则
表4 “新式模板”的数字贸易规则 | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FTA | 数据流动 | 隐私保护 | 市场准入 | 贸易促进 | ||||||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | |
新加坡—新西兰(2000) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H |
新加坡—美国(2003) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | ||
新加坡—约旦(2004) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | × | × |
新加坡—印度尼西亚(2005) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | × | × | H | H | × | × |
新加坡—韩国(2005) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | × | × | H | H | S | × |
新加坡—巴拿马(2006) | S | S | S | H | H | × | × | H | × | S | × | |||||||
新加坡—秘鲁(2008) | × | × | × | × | × | × | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | S | H | × | × | × |
新加坡—GCC国家(2008) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | × | × |
新加坡—哥斯达黎加(2010) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | × | × |
新加坡—中国台湾(2013) | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | S |
新加坡—土耳其(2015) | × | × | × | × | × | H | S | × | S | S | H | H | × | × | H | × | H | S |
新加坡—澳大利亚(2016) | H | H | S | × | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | × | H | × | H | H |
新加坡—中国(2017) | × | × | × | × | H | H | S | H | H | S | × | × | × | S | H | × | H | H |
新加坡—欧盟(2018) | S | × | × | × | H | × | S | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | H | × |
新加坡—澳大利亚(2020) | H | H | S | S | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | × | H | × | H | H |
DEPA(2020) | H | H | S | S | H | H | H | H | H | S | H | H | × | × | H | × | H | H |
RCEP(2020) | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | H | H | S | × | × | S | × | H | × | H | S |
注:序号1~18代表的规则依次为跨境数据流动,计算设施本地化,网络开放,公开政府数据,个人信息保护(国际标准),个人信息保护(国内标准),网络消费者保护,非应邀商业电子信息,统一监管框架,网络安全,数字产品国民待遇,数字产品最惠国待遇,源代码问题,技术中立原则,电子传输免征关税,载体媒介,电子认证、电子签名和数字证书,无纸化贸易。H代表硬性规则,S代表软性规则,×代表协定中未涉及的规则。 | ||||||||||||||||||
资料来源:作者根据RTA数据库及《数字贸易协定》整理所得。 |
Table 4: Digital Trade Rules for the "New Template"
4. "Chinese Template"
According to data released by UNCTAD, China's digital service trade accounted for 5.04% of the global digital service trade volume in 2021, and digital service trade has become one of the important pillars of China's service trade. From the perspective of China's establishment of digital trade rules, the relevant rules focus on "exemption of tariffs on electronic transmission", "electronic signatures and authentication", "paperless trade", "personal information protection", and "online consumer protection". The conclusion of the above rules indicates that China is based on its comparative advantage in cross-border e-commerce, actively promoting the facilitation of digital trade and the improvement of the online business environment, while emphasizing national and personal information security. This is consistent with China's position proposed in the WTO e-commerce negotiations. In 2020, RCEP introduced hard rules such as "cross-border free flow of data" and "localization of computing facilities" for the first time, making it the highest standard FTA China has concluded in the field of digital trade governance, which is of great significance to China's understanding of high-level digital trade rules.
From the main content and evolution path, the "Chinese template" has the following characteristics: firstly, the digital trade rules were concluded late, and the number of FTAs covering digital trade rules was the smallest (5). Secondly, there is a lack of textual paradigms for digital trade rules based on self-interest. Due to the relatively late opening of China's digital trade rules and weak discourse power in the field of international digital governance, rules related to trade promotion and privacy protection are mostly based on previous texts, and relevant rules have not yet formed a deepening form with Chinese characteristics. Thirdly, the legal binding force of digital trade rules is relatively weak. Although most of the digital trade rules concluded by China are hard rules, the five FTAs concluded by China have all excluded dispute settlement mechanisms. The lack of dispute resolution mechanisms will reduce the legal certainty of relevant provisions. Fourthly, the establishment of certain clauses reflects inclusivity towards developing countries. Taking the "exemption of tariffs on electronic transmission" rule as an example, the permanent exemption of tariffs on electronic transmission inevitably results in the erosion of tax bases in developing countries and the transfer of profits. Based on considerations of the interests of developing countries, China's proposal in WTO e-commerce negotiations supports following WTO regulations and temporarily suspending taxation on electronic transmissions. This position is also reflected in the relevant rules of FTA. Unlike the wording of permanent exemption from tariffs on electronic transmission in the first three templates, the five FTAs concluded by China are all "temporary" exemption from tariffs on electronic transmission. The digital trade rules of the "Chinese template" are shown in Table 5.
表5 “中式模板”的数字贸易规则
表5 “中式模板”的数字贸易规则 | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FTA | 数据流动 | 隐私保护 | 市场准入 | 贸易促进 | ||||||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | |
中国—韩国(2015) | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | H | S |
中国—澳大利亚(2015) | × | × | × | × | H | H | S | S | H | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | H | H |
中国—新加坡(2017) | × | × | × | × | H | H | S | H | H | S | × | × | × | S | H | × | H | H |
中国—毛里求斯(2019) | × | × | × | × | H | H | S | × | × | × | × | × | × | × | H | × | H | H |
RCEP(2020) | H | H | × | × | H | H | H | H | H | S | × | × | S | × | H | × | H | S |
注:序号1~18代表的规则依次为跨境数据流动,计算设施本地化,网络开放,公开政府数据,个人信息保护(国际标准),个人信息保护(国内标准),网络消费者保护,非应邀商业电子信息,统一监管框架,网络安全,数字产品国民待遇,数字产品最惠国待遇,源代码问题,技术中立原则,电子传输免征关税,载体媒介,电子认证、电子签名和数字证书,无纸化贸易。H代表硬性规则,S代表软性规则,×代表协定中未涉及的规则。 | ||||||||||||||||||
资料来源:作者根据RTA数据库及《数字贸易协定》整理所得。 |
Table 5: Digital Trade Rules for "Chinese Template"
Three major countries' digital trade opening-up strategies
Based on the representative e-commerce proposals and digital trade rules proposed by the United States, Japan, Europe, Singapore, and China, combined with the typical national digital trade strategy choices summarized by Chen and Gao, the digital trade strategies of the five countries can be summarized into three types.
The United States advocates a digital trade openness strategy under unilateralism. On the surface, the United States formulates various digital trade rules aimed at breaking down digital trade barriers and promoting trade liberalization and openness in the field of digital trade. However, in reality, the digital trade freedom pursued by the United States has a clear unilateral color, lacking inclusiveness and coordination. For example, USMCA ignores the differences in digital industry infrastructure and digital regulatory governance levels between Mexico, Canada, and the United States, requiring contracting parties to remove regulatory exceptions in "free flow of data across borders," remove regulatory and security exceptions in "localization of computing facilities," and remove source code vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure in "source code issues. This undifferentiated high standard rule is essentially the result of the United States, based on its position as a net exporter of digital trade, using Canada and Mexico's dependence on its trade to forcibly regionalize unilateralism in a "bamboo pole" manner. Moreover, many rules in the "American template" are centered around corporate interests, ignoring the unity of national, corporate, and individual interests. China and EU countries have a low sense of recognition of the relevant rules and find it difficult to fully accept them.
The three economies of the European Union, Japan, and Singapore can be summarized as conditional digital trade openness strategies, and they have their own principles to adhere to in the digital trade openness strategy. The EU adheres to the principles of "audiovisual exceptions" and "privacy protection", and the formulation of relevant digital trade rules always takes these two as prerequisites. Especially for the United States, the EU insists on prioritizing privacy protection on the issue of "free cross-border flow of data" and emphasizes that storing data locally is the best practice for protecting personal privacy. Under the pressure of multiple EU policies, Microsoft has also been forced to accept the practice of storing data within the EU. The digital trade rules of Japan and Singapore mostly follow the "American template", but still adhere to their own positions in some rule making. For example, Japan attaches great importance to personal privacy protection in the financial industry, and UJDTA's "localization of computing facilities" particularly emphasizes security and regulatory exceptions in the financial industry. At the same time, Japan and Singapore are also very concerned about the vulnerable position of developing countries in the field of digital trade, and have increased their recognition and acceptance of digital trade rules by introducing cooperation and inclusive clauses. Its essential purpose is to form an international market through extensive FTA networks and create opportunities for the development of digital trade between the two countries. On the one hand, by targeting the "American template" to maintain digital trade relations with the United States and safeguard the country's leading position and discourse power in the field of digital trade rules; On the other hand, deepen its digital trade connections with countries in East Asia, the South Pacific, and other regions, and obtain digital dividends from relevant countries.
China is implementing a gradual opening-up strategy that balances efficiency and security. On the one hand, China advocates a series of measures to promote digital trade facilitation, such as "electronic signatures and authentication," "paperless trade," and "online consumer protection," based on its advantages in cross-border goods trade and e-commerce platforms; On the other hand, China emphasizes data sovereignty and the protection of domestic digital industries, believing that a balance should be struck between cross-border data flows and the protection of national and personal information. In relevant rules, a large operational space has been reserved for a country's regulatory autonomy (such as Articles 14 and 15 in Section 4 of the RCEP e-commerce chapter). At the same time, strict measures for network security and digital market access have been taken to protect the immature digital industry in China. The gradual opening-up strategy implemented by China to some extent reflects the position and demands of developing countries, while balancing digital freedom, efficiency, and national and individual security, leaving time for the growth of a country's digital industry.
The 'Chinese Solution' for Four Digital Trade
The impact of the constantly evolving digital service trade on the traditional trading system has become a fact. China needs to accelerate cooperation with other countries in the field of digital trade and quickly propose a "Chinese solution" that is in line with its own and the interests of developing countries.
(1) Actively participate in digital economy governance under multilateral frameworks
Although the progress of WTO e-commerce negotiations has been slow, it remains the main "battlefield" for international digital economy governance under the multilateral framework. China should actively participate in e-commerce negotiations under the WTO framework, and during the negotiation process, it should first conduct in-depth research on relevant concepts and key issues. China is still in the early stages of digital trade governance, and there is still a vague definition of the concept of digital trade. The impact of key issues on the trade patterns and international division of labor of developing countries is still unclear. Based on this, China should conduct comprehensive research on the theory and rules of digital trade, combining the technology, economy, and rules of developing countries, and comprehensively analyze the advantages and disadvantages of relevant rules for digital trade in developing countries. Secondly, construct e-commerce negotiation proposals using the method of "greatest common divisor". The purpose of WTO e-commerce negotiations is to bridge the digital divide among countries by providing an inclusive solution that benefits all stakeholders. Therefore, China needs to accurately grasp the core interests of all countries, integrate the consensus of most countries' interests with inclusive proposals, and promote substantive results in e-commerce negotiations. Thirdly, explore the path of win-win cooperation with developed countries. In the process of conducting e-commerce negotiations, China inevitably involves digital trade rules represented by the core interests of developed countries. In response to such rules, China should actively consult with developed countries and gradually narrow the development gap and ideological differences with developed countries in the field of digital trade through measures such as setting soft rules, transition periods, exception regulations, and technical assistance, creating conditions for deeper cooperation.
(2) Pay attention to the negotiation of digital trade rules in regional trade agreements
In the face of obstacles in WTO e-commerce negotiations, joining digital trade rules negotiations in FTA is a "suboptimal choice". In this process, China needs to actively align with high standard digital trade rules. At present, China is actively applying to join CPTPP and DEPA, clarifying the difficulty of accepting digital trade rules in relevant agreements based on domestic legislation. If there are conflicts between the provisions and domestic legislation and regulation, they should be critically absorbed and relevant contingency plans should be formulated as soon as possible. At the same time, the modular features of DEPA can be properly utilized, and some clauses with significant differences will not be added temporarily. Secondly, accelerate the introduction and upgrading of digital trade rules in China's FTA. At present, China has signed 17 FTAs, is currently negotiating 11 FTAs, and is studying 8 FTAs. These FTAs are undoubtedly important carriers for China to negotiate digital trade rules with countries around the world. Therefore, China can streamline the digital trade rules signed between its contracting parties and other economies, compare and analyze them with the digital trade rules currently concluded between China and other contracting parties, clarify the differences in text paradigms, legal constraints, and coverage of relevant rules and provisions, accurately grasp the highest standards of rules and provisions that China and contracting parties can accept, and accumulate experience for China's existing FTA upgrade negotiations. Third, rely on the "the Belt and Road" initiative to expand the influence of the "Chinese template". The "the Belt and Road" initiative is essentially an open cooperation platform, lacking menu like substantive measures. Considering that the digital development level of most of the countries jointly constructing the "the Belt and Road" is lagging behind, China can carry out cooperation in the field of digital trade with the countries jointly constructing the "Belt and Road", help relevant countries improve the construction of digital infrastructure, and standardize network information security regulatory measures. On this basis, we will actively seek to build the FTA network of the "the Belt and Road", formulate digital trade rules benefiting many countries at different levels, and further enhance China's international influence and voice in the field of digital trade governance.
(3) Adhere to China's position and improve domestic institutional construction
From the experience of developed countries such as the United States and Europe, the formulation of digital trade rules is essentially an extension of national (regional) digital industries, regulatory standards, etc. in the international arena. Therefore, China should improve its domestic "top-level design" and build digital trade rules with Chinese characteristics. Firstly, improve the cross-border data flow system. Cross border data flow is one of the core contents of digital trade and a key reason for the differences between China and European and American countries. China should formulate a sound cross-border data flow management mechanism in accordance with the relevant requirements of the Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China, and promote cross-border flow security assessment with data grading and classification management mode as the core as soon as possible. In addition, China needs to strengthen the supervision of cross-border data flow, clarify the purpose and norms of cross-border data use through setting data labels and other means, and improve the efficiency of data supervision. Secondly, establish an open digital economy regulatory system. China needs to carefully explore and distinguish whether the opening up of the digital economy has a negative impact on national sovereignty, digital industry development, and personal information security, further clarify the regulatory and governance responsibilities of various departments, and provide feasible contingency plans for potential risks. Further improve the digital economy regulatory system under the open mode based on the existing digital economy governance logic. Thirdly, promote replicable digital trade facilitation measures. China has implemented many measures to facilitate digital trade, including "single window", "electronic port", and "overseas warehouse". Free trade zones represented by Shanghai have adopted different deepening models for these measures, such as the Shanghai single window "Credit Insurance Green Channel". China should summarize various digital trade facilitation measures and build them into a complete system. At the same time, actively engage in exchanges and cooperation with other countries, share relevant experiences to expand the application scope of best practice cases in various countries, and use this as an opportunity to form digital trade facilitation rules with Chinese characteristics.