波兰与欧盟关于农业的谈判——基于普特南双层博弈理论的分析

Abstract:Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory suggests that the actions of negotiators at both the international and domestic levels have an impact on the outcome of international negotiations. This paper draws on the two-level game theory to analyze the agricultural negotiations between Poland and the EU. At the international level，Polish negotiators used the identity of an old EU member and the domestic government crisis to pressure the EU to make concessions，while the EU used threatening tactics and the Polish Catholic Church to expand Poland’s “win-set” in order to meet the EU’s negotiating demands. At the domestic or intra-EU level，pressure from Polish farmers，political parties and interest groups pushed Polish negotiators to develop a strong negotiating position，while the EU did not meet all of Poland’s demands on account of the EU budget and differences among member states in the agricultural negotiations.

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