Abstract:“Parliamentary privilege”，as a part of “Lexparliamenti ”，can be traced back to the “Bill of Rights” or even earlier and is absorbed by the parliamentary politics of countries under the modern constitutional system.The autonomy of parliament and the legal immunity enjoyed by its members gives rise to the exclusive jurisdiction and ultimate decision-making power of the parliament in relation to its internal issues internal，which，to some extent，ruled out the court's “intervention”.With the consolidation of democracy，the expansion of the parliamentary power，the gradual separation of parliamentary core functions and internal administrative affairs and the increasing demand for public transparency and fairness in the operation of the parliament，the scope of parliamentary privileges has been changing accordingly.In this regard，courts have final power to determine whether a matter falls within Parliamentary privilege.There is similar tension between Legislative Council and the judiciary In Hong Kong where common law is maintained after its return..It is challenging for the Hong Kong Courts to inherit the principles of the common law and make necessary adjustments under the new constitutional order established by the Basic Law.Leung Kwok Hung v.The President of the Legislative Council of the HKSARand CE ＆ SJ v.Sixtus Leung Chung Hang and others will be closely discussed and examined in this paper to demonstrate how the Basic Law and the principle of “constitutionality” have replaced the common law principle and the “necessity test” as the legal basis for resolving disputes related to parliamentary privileges，which subsequently gives rise to the principle of “non-intervention”.
收起
京公网安备11010202008212号